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Abstract This paper analyzes the de-facto integration in some Emerging Market Economies based on behavior of deviations
from Covered Interest Parities in the last 10 years. It tests for modified market efficiency conditions in the presence of real world
frictions and arrives at a single measure of de-facto integration for some Emerging Market Economies in the post-globalization
era. An Asymmetric Self Exciting Threshold Autoregressive model (SETAR) is used to estimate bands of speculative inaction.
Market efficiency requires the thresholds to be no wider than the transaction costs and the deviations to follow a stationary
process outside the chosen bands. The analysis reveals a much more efficient financial market than has been allowed for in
previous studies. The estimates of thresholds for emerging markets follow the pattern expected, given information on de-jure
restrictions. Based on the estimated model, the paper constructs an index of de-facto integration and we find that Phillipines
and India are the highest ranked amongst emerging markets in terms of their financial integration, and that Malaysia and
Thailand occupy the lowest spot.
I. Introduction
The last decade has seen a massive increase in financial flows across the world, opening up
of financial markets in emerging markets and creation of markets for financial instruments that
1My sincere thanks to my advisor, Joshua Aizenman, without whose guidance this would not have been possible. I
would also like to thank Kenneth Kletzer, Michael Hutchison, Menzie Chinn, Bruno Sanso, Nirvikar Singh, Yin-Wong
Cheung, Thomas Wu, Alan Taylor, Jan Piplack, Puru Vashishtha and Nadzeya Sihayeva for invaluable advice and
help. All (the several) errors remaining are mine.
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never existed before in these economies. Most emerging economies now have markets for forward
transactions in their currencies and for complex financial instruments. This paper is concerned with
analysing the efficiency of currency and short term capital markets in some EMEs. An assessment
of efficiency of global financial markets and their ability to promote savings, investment and growth
is important to inform debate over the regulation and control over capital flows, particularly in the
wake of the recent emerging market crises and increasing concerns about fluidity of capital. A
policy of instituting capital controls loses some of its gloss if markets are known to be efficient and
seems more compelling if they are not. Moreover, financial integration has a profound impact on
the efficacy of fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies. For example, an increase in domestic
interest rates will not prevent large capital outflows in the event of a crisis [as happened in Brazil
and Russia in late 1990’s] if it only results in higher expected depreciation and if Uncovered Inter-
est Parity holds. At a time where design of domestic regulatory mechanisms is a key policy issue,
a measure of market efficiency and integration is important. While an apprailsal of the financial
globalization of Emerging markets would include a study of equity markets, the analysis of currency
and short term capital markets is the first step. Covered Interest Parity and Uncovered Interest
parity are the cornerstones of most exchange rate models. A test of these assumptions casts light
on how well these models can be expected to explain actual exchange rate movements, and also
what alternative assumptions might yield better models.
This paper analyzes the de-facto integration in some leading Emerging Market Economies
based on behavior of deviations from Covered Interest Parity in the last 10 years. It is concerned
with understanding what market efficiency means in the presence of real world frictions, testing
for that efficiency and arriving at a single measure of de-facto integration for some 2 Emerging
Market Economies (EMEs henceforth) in the post-globalization era. Our analysis leads us to a
model with no-arbitrage bands, even in a world with risk-neutral agents. The idea that existence
of transactions costs and capital controls leads to no-aribitrage bands within which speculative
forces would not operate is not new, and a similar derivation of no-arbitrage bands in the pres-
ence of transactions costs is contained in Balke and Wohar (1998). We extend this to a world of
2Sample restricted by data availability
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capital controls and derive the implications of different types of controls on the bandwidth and
symmetry of the bands and derive testable implications of presence of such frictions. Asymmetric
Self Exciting Threshold Autoregressive model (SETAR) is used to estimate bands of speculative
inaction for EMEs and some developed market economies and the results are largely as predicted.
Our estimated thresholds are non-trivial, asymmetric and are larger in the negative direction for
countries known to have imposed controls on capital outflows (Malaysia, India). Also as expected,
the thresholds are narrower and enclose a larger percentage of deviations in developed markets.
What this means is that one need not appeal to large risk premia to explain the ‘failiure’ of interest
parities in EMEs. Our analysis also allows us to understand why tests of UIP have failed even
for developed market economies. The answer lies in failing to account for modification, in theory,
of market efficiency conditions in the absence of costless and control-free arbitrage. Based on the
estimated model, the paper constructs an index of de-facto integration and we find that Phillipines
and India are the highest ranked amongst emerging markets in terms of their financial integration,
and that Malaysia and Thailand occupy the lowest spot. These are consistent with the findings
of Francis, Hasan and Hunter (2002) who estimate a non-linear model to explain the deviations
from Uncovered Interest Parity for some EMEs. We also compare our Integration Index to two
other indices of capital account openness. The correlation between our index and the de-jure index
of Chinn (2006) is high, but that between our index and the quantitative measure of Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2006) is low, indicating that price measures are important in assessing integration,
that conditions on the ground - enforcement and incentives/opportunities - matter for arbitrage
and simply an increase in global flows cannot be expected to do the honours.
Bulk of the research on financial integration has so far focused on industrialized countries,
while emerging markets too have seen a substantial rise in openness to flows and level of flows (and
have also begun to realize the demands openness makes on domestic macroeconomic management).
Empirical literature on CIP has generally tended to validate the hypothesis for the industrial coun-
tries, within the limits of the transaction costs and limits to speed of adjustment due to imperfectly
elastic supply of funds. Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) compute covered interest differentials with
monthly data vis--vis the Pound Sterling for US and German markets for the period 1921-2003 and
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find that the differentials were large between 1920 and 1980, but shrank considerably after 1980.
Significantly, these differences became lower post 1980 than they were at the peak of the Gold
Standard. And have been falling since Frankel (1991) estimated a time trend in absolute value of
covered interest differentials for 25 developed countries during the 1980’s and found a statistically
significant negative trend for 10 of those 25 countries. Other studies that have estimated the dif-
ferential in (6) and tested for presence of profitable opportunities outside of the ‘transfer points’
include Frenkel and Levich (1975), Clinton (1988), Taylor (1989), Peel and Taylor (2002) and
Obstfeld and Taylor (2004). These transfer points have been estimated variously through data
on triangular arbitrage, bid-ask spreads and brokerage fees and endogenously through a Threshold
Autoregressive (TAR) model in Peel and Taylor (2002) and Obstfeld and Taylor (2004). Popper
(1993) Popper (1993) and Vieria (2003) provide evidence that CIP more or less holds even at
longer maturities (more than one year). Deviations were found to be linked to out-of-line fiscal
policies.Balke and Wohar (1998)3 study covered interest differentials between US dollar and UK
pound for the period 1974-93 using TAR model, but instead of estimating constant thresholds,
they compute time-varying thresholds from those implied by the modified CIP conditions from the
data and then compute the AR coefficients for each regime econometrically. In this paper, we stick
to estimating constant bands because as we discuss below, capital controls and other frictions not
entirely captured by the bid-ask spreads also influence the thresholds. In the Emerging markets
economies which are the subject out our analysis, such restrictions have played a particularly im-
portant role. Branson and Taylor (2004) is a study of covered interest parity between US and
Russia, which finds large bands around the equality using the TAR technique, but these bands are
not symmetric. The lower bound is close to zero and the upper bound, which involves borrowing
in US dollars and lending in Rubles to be large, about 1 per cent. In our work below, we explain
where the asymmetry may derive from. The bulk of literature on financial integration in EMEs
had been confined to testing uncovered interest parity due to lack of conventional forward contracts
and market data. With the developement of such markets in many of these economies since the
late 1990’s there is now enough data to explore the issue of covered arbitrage in these economies,
which is what we do here - and compare the working of these markets in EMEs to some developed
3My Thanks to Menzie Chinn for this reference
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countries.
Section II is an overview of the modified CIP conditions, Section III describes the data and
presents the summary statistics for CIP deviations Section IV presents the results and Section V
concludes.
II. CIP in the Presence of Frictions
In a fully integrated world with perfectly competitive profit maximizing agents and no trans-
actions costs, the following Covered Interest Parity (CIP) condition would hold in equilibrium:
δt = P
(Ft+k − St
St
)− (it+k − i∗t+k) = 0 (1)
where δt is the covered interest differential, it+k and i∗t+k are respectively returns on comparable
domestic and foreign assets between time t and t+k, expressed as per cent per annum. St is the
domestic currency price of foreign currency, Ft+k is the forward rate or the kth period domestic
currency price of foreign exchange delivered in that period. P is a scaling factor, used to annualize
the first term (for example, if the forward rates are of maturity 1 month, then P = 1200). Since all
the variables in the above equation are known a priori, any deviation from this parity in our model
world represents pure profits and therefore cannot exist in equilibrium.
However, in a world with oligopolistic players in financial markets, underdeveloped money
markets, exchange or capital controls or risk of such controls, differential taxation, limited supply of
capital, sovereign immunities, transaction costs and other inconveniences, forward rate may differ
from current spot rate by more than the interest differential, even with efficient and risk neutral
markets. The arbitrage conditions are then modified in the manner discussed below. We start with
a discussion of transactions costs, encapsulated in a positive bid-ask spreads on exchange rates,
and then move on to a discussion of capital controls.
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II.1. Transactions Costs and CIP
When bid-ask spreads exist, the ask rate for a currency in terms of say US Dollars (denoted
USD henceforth) is the number of USD the investor would have to give up in order to get one unit
of the foreign currency from the dealer. The bid rate for a currency is the number of units of USD
the investor gets when she sells one unit of the currency to a foreign exchange dealer, and it is
equal precisely to the inverse of the ask rate for USD in terms of that currency. This last identity
is used often in the succeeding analysis. We denote by Fb the one-period forward bid rate for a
foreign currency, expressed as USD per unit of that currency, by Fa the forward ask rate for that
currency, also expressed as USD per foreign currency unit. Spot rates are similarly expressed in
terms of USD per foreign currency unit and subscripted accordingly. The spread on forward rate
and spot rates are defined respectively, as:
ζF = Fa − Fb (2)
ζS = Sa − Sb (3)
Suppose the transactions involve the US Dollar and the Chilean Peso, denoted CHP. The US
is assumed to be the ’home’ country and i is the US interest rate of one period maturity, i∗ is the
foreign interest rate of the same maturity. When an investor buys CHP spot with USD, she can do
so at the spot ask price for CHP (which is equal precisely to the inverse of spot bid price for USD
in terms of CHP) and can sell them forward at the forward bid price for CHP. A covered arbitrage
that involves borrowing in USD to invest in CHP, in a world where this difference between bid and
ask prices exists, will be profitable if and only if4:
(1 + i∗)Fb
Sa
> (1 + i) (4)
4Suppose the investor borrows 1 USD today. She can buy 1
Sa
= Scb CHP with the one USD spot. (S
c
b = bid rate
for USD in terms of CHP and is expressed as CHP per USD). At the end of the period, the investor would have
(1+i∗)
Sa
CHP and have to pay (1 + i) back in USD. The sale of (1+i
∗)
Sa
CHP forward today would yield Fb
(1+i∗)
Sa
USD
tomorrow, resulting in the equation that follows
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i.e. if
δp =
Fb − Sa
Sa
− (i− i∗) > 0 (5)
An outflow from CHP and into USD similarly is profitable if the following holds:
(1 + i)Sb
Fa
> (1 + i∗) (6)
or,
δn =
Fa − Sb
Sb
− (i− i∗) < 0 (7)
Since δp 6= δn, Covered Interest Parity now gets complicated. It requires that the following hold:
δp ≤ 0 and δn ≥ 0 (8)
Note here that since ask rates are always greater than the corresponsing bid rates (otherwise the
dealer would make a loss), δp ≤ δn always. The equality holds only when the bid and ask rates
are equal, in the frictionless world. When bid rates differ from ask rates, δn and δp cannot both
be equal to zero at once. If δp ≤ 0 holds, there is a (positive) range over which δn can vary,
without violating the modified Covered Interest Parity condition, and it is given by [0, (δn− δp)] or
equivalently, by [0, (FaSb −
Fb
Sa
)]. Similarly, when δn ≥ 0, there is a negative range over which δp can
vary, without violating the modified CIP. If we had data only on δn, there would be a range given
by [κn, 0] = [(FbSa − FaSb ), 0] within which arbitrage wouldn’t take place. If we were to measure only
δp, this no-arbitrage band would be given by [0, (FaSb −
Fb
Sa
)].
As it happens, we are measuring the average of the bid and ask rates in the spot and forward
markets to arrive at our measure of CIP. Our computed forward and spot rates are:
F =
Fb + Fa
2
= Fb +
ζF
2
= Fa − ζF2 (9)
S =
Sb + Sa
2
= Sb +
ζS
2
= Sa − ζS2 (10)
And the computed CIP differential:
F − S
S
− (i− i∗) = Fb +
ζF
2 − Sa + ζS2
Sa − ζS2
− (i− i∗) (11)
=
(
Fb − Sa
Sa
)(
1 +
ζS
2Sa
)
+
ζF + ζS
2Sa − ζS − (i− i
∗) (12)
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[Using 11+x ≈ 1− x for small x]
⇒ δˆ =
(
Fb − Sa
Sa
)
− (i− i∗) +
(
Fb − Sa
Sa
)
ζS
2Sa
+
ζF + ζS
2Sa − ζS (13)
⇒ δˆ = δp + C1 (14)
where
C1 =
(
Fb − Sa
Sa
)
ζS
2Sa
+
ζF + ζS
2Sa − ζS
Similarly,
F − S
S
− (i− i∗) = Fa −
ζF
2 − Sb − ζS2
Sb +
ζS
2
− (i− i∗) (15)
=
(
Fa − Sb
Sb
)(
1− ζS
2Sb
)
− ζF + ζS
2Sb + ζS
− (i− i∗) (16)
⇒ δˆ = δn − C2 (17)
where
C2 =
(
Fa − Sb
Sb
)
ζS
2Sb
+
ζF + ζS
2Sb + ζS
When δp is less than zero, so that arbitrage out of CHP is not profitable, it may seem
profitable to the observer because δˆ may be positive, and the same holds for arbitrage out of CHP.
C1 and C2 are not easily signed, and vary not just with the spreads but also with the forward and
spot rates themselves. The assumption that our model is making is that C1 and C2 are bounded,
and it is these bounds that constitute our thresholds. It is also possible, with some furthur algebra,
to say something about the symmetry of these bounds, or the lack of it. Lets compare C1 and C2
term by term. The second terms of both are equal, because the denominators of both equal 2S,
from equation 10. From the first terms, using again the fact of ask rates being greater than bid
rates, we arrive at:
ζS
2Sb
>
ζS
2Sa
and
Fa − Sb
Sb
>
Fb − Sa
Sa
⇒ C2(1) > C1(1)
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So that, C2 > C1, implying an asymmetry in the thresholds, even with symmetric costs to or
controls on arbitrage. For any given δ, this would imply a larger negative threshold in absolute
value than the positive one, if C1 is positive. This would occur if one of the following is true:
1. Fb > Sa i.e. the foreign currency (CHP here) is expected to appreciate. Note that since
the ask rates are higher than bid rates, this doesn’t hold if exchange rate is expected to
remain constant. In our sample, most countries’ currencies have seen a secular appreciation
against the dollar, so one would expect the negative threshold to be larger than the positive
one, although this result should be applied cautiously...we are talking here about forward
rates of maturities 3 months or less, so short term considerations come into play. Moreover,
the result only talks about expected appreciation incorporated in forward rates, not actual
ex-post appreciation, which is what one observes in the sample.
2. Fb < Sa but
ζF+ζS
Sa+Sb
>
(
Sa−Fb
Sa
)
ζS
2Sa
, which is to say that any expected depreciation incorpo-
rated in the forward rate is not too large5.
II.2. CIP in the presence of capital controls.
The analysis above assumes that all distortions and costs are fully reflected in the bid-ask
spreads. In practice, this is not true. Countries tax foreign investments and earning at different
rates, may impose taxes or reserve requirements on foreign capital flows for the explicit purpose
of encouraging or discouraging such flows, or may impose outright limits on transaction volumes,
among other measures. For example, Brazil increased tax payable by foreigners on fixed interest
investments in Brazil from 5 per cent to 9 per cent between October 1994 and March 1995. Chile
imposed a stamp tax of 1.2 per cent per year on foreign loans, applicable on all credits in their first
year, except trade loans in 1991. In this section, we look at the implications of capital controls for
the CIP relationship, and how this relates it to our model.
5This depreciation can be quite substantial without being too large. Note that the above can be rearranged to
get 2ζF
ζS
+ 1 > Sb−Fb
Sa
. Since ζF > ζS , the LHS is greater than 3.
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II.2.1. Tax on Inflows
Suppose there exists a tax τ on foreign inflows into Chile (the analysis is analogous to a tax
on outflows). Now, a foreigner investing in Chile can make a profit iff:
(1− τ)(1 + i∗)Fb
Sa
> (1 + i)
⇒ Fb
Sa
> 1 + i− i∗ + τ
⇒ Fb − Sa
Sa
− (i− i∗) > τ (18)
which in terms of computed δ is,
δˆ =
F − S
S
− (i− i∗) = δp + C1 > τ (19)
With a tax on inflows only, the condition for profitable outflows remains unchanged. Covered
Interest Parity then requires:
δp ≤ τ and δn ≥ 0 (20)
i.e. : −C2 ≤ δˆ ≤ τ + C1 (21)
thus increasing the positive threshold. A tax on outflows would push downwards the negative
threshold.
II.2.2. Reserve Requirements
Suppose, as in Chile between 1994 and 1998, there exists a requirement to keep as unremu-
nerated reserves, u per cent of every USD of inflow into the country. This amount is paid back
at time h, which let’s assume is greater than or equal to 1, the maturity period of our short term
speculative investment. Assume also that the return from investment is repatriated at the time the
investmenet matures and that interest rates are constant throughout (not realistic, but dropping
this assumption will only reinforce our results). At time 0, the choice being faced is between in-
vesting a USD for h periods at the interest rate i or to invest 1−uSa at interest rate i
∗ for one period
and re-invest this in USD for h− 1 periods at interest rate i. Now, a profitable speculative inflow
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into Chile requires that the following condition hold6:
(1− u)(1 + i∗)(1 + i)h−1Fb
Sa
+ u ≥ (1 + i)h (22)
⇒ Fb − Sa
Sa
− (i− i∗) ≥ 1 + i− u(1 + i)
1−h
(1− u)(1 + i∗) − 1− i+ i
∗ (23)
the right hand side of which can be verified to be positive and to increase with the reserve require-
ment, u and the period that reserves are held, h. The last can be interpreted to mean that the
burden of a fixed length reserve requirement is greater, the shorter the period of investment. A
quantitative restriction on capital inflows therefore, pushes up the positive threshold. Similarly, a
quantitative restriction on capital outflows can be shown to push down the negative threshold.
One can summarize the testable implications derived from the above discussion as follows:
1. The no-arbitrage band [κn, κp] is larger than the largest spread.
2. The thresholds are likely to be asymmetric around zero, with larger negative thresholds for
currencies that are expected to appreciate or not to depreciate too much.
3. Taxes and quantitative controls on capital inflows increase the positive threshold, and controls
or taxes on outflows increase the absolute value of the negative threshold.
The impact of limited supply of capital is not derived, but is likely to be towards reducing
the speed with which the differentials revert back to the band. In the absence of market
rationality, the differentials could follow a non-stationary process even outside the bands.
II.3. Empirical Model
In what follows, we estimate these no-arbitrage bands using an Asymmetric Self-Exciting
Threshold Autoregressive model (SETAR) - self-exciting because the thresholds are lags of
δ itself, and asymmetric because the negative threshold is allowed to differ from the positive
6This is in terms of USD at time h.
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threshold. It takes the form:
δt = ρiδt−1 + it for κn < δt−1 < κp (24)
δt − κn = ρn(δt−1 − κn) + nt for δt−1 ≤ κn (25)
δt − κp = ρp(δt−1 − κp) + pt for δt−1 ≥ κp (26)
where jt ∼ N(0, σ2j ), j = i, n, p and κn and κp are the negative and positive thresholds
respectively. Note that this model implies that speculative activity will push the deviations
to the edges of the band, rather than its center. The AR(1) process within the band is allowed
to be a random walk, but the hypothesis of efficient arbitrage states that the AR(1) process
outside the bands be stationary. If the thresholds were known, the model could be estimated
by ordinary least squares applied separately to the inner regime and outer regime observa-
tions. But since the thresholds aren’t known, we do a grid search over possible threshold
combinations. If every value of δt occurring in the sample was taken as a likely threshold
value, the possible combinations could be extremely large. Moreover, one needs to allow suf-
ficient number of observations in the outer regimes to make estimation possible. Therefore,
all the percentiles between the 5th and 95th percentiles are taken and separated into sets of
negative thresholds candidates and positive threshold candidates. The model then choses the
combination of negative and positive threshold values that maximize the likelihood function:
L = −1
2
∑
δt−1∈(κ1,κ2)
[lnσ2i +
2it
σ2i
] (27)
−1
2
∑
δt−1≥κp
[lnσ2p +
2pt
σ2p
]
−1
2
∑
δt−1≤κn
[lnσ2n +
2nt
σ2n
]
In the estimation exercises below, we considered only ‘non-crisis’ periods, with crisis periods
being identified as six months before and after a crisis month identified by Kaminsky and
Reinhart (1999) criteria. An argument can be made that the crisis periods involve imminent
defaults or threats thereof which need to be taken into account in deriving the relevant parity
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conditions, something that we have not done yet.
II.4. Integration Index
To construct the Integration Index, we first normalize each of the various indicators of openess
derived from our model, viz. the threshold bandwidth, the percentage of observations lying
in outer regimes, the median positive and (absolute value of) negative deviation outside
threshold and the third quartile of continuous runs outside thresholds. Observations on each
of the five variables are normalized by subtracting from them their inter-country mean and
dividing by the standard deviation. This is done for both maturities, one and three months.
For Malaysia, Thailand and Mexico, for which data on one of the maturities is not available,
we use the available maturity’s data to approximate for the missing maturity model7. The
normalized observations are then averaged for each country and the negative of the resulting
number taken to arrive at our Integration Index8. Note that this index is centered at zero
and gives only an ordinal ranking. We compare this index with two other available indices
of financial integration/openess. The first one is constructed by Chinn-Ito9 and is a de-
jure measure of openess constructed using Principal Component Analysis. The second is a
quantitative measure of de-facto integration constructed as the ratio of total foreign assets
and liabilities to GDP using data constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006). Each of
these indices is available yearly, upto 2004. We average these for each of our countries over
our sample period (1995-2004 for all the developed countries and shorter for EMEs) to arrive
at a single number which we then compare with our index.
7The analysis was repeated after dropping these three countries and the ranking of the rest of the countries are
identical relative to each other in the smaller sample.
8Note that each of our variables are defined so that a larger value (say of number of observations outside threshold)
would mean lower integration, so that a simple average of the normalized values would be a larger number the less
integrated the country is.
9Chinn (2006)
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III. The Data
Data used is of daily frequency, and is sourced from Datastream (for forward rates and for
interest and exchange rates of developed markets (excluding Hong Kong)), Global Financial
Database (for interest rates and exchange rates of emerging market economies and Hong
Kong) and the online database of Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis (for Euro-dollar deposit
rates). Data from IMF’s International Financial Statistics was used for generating index of
currency market turbulence, to identify crisis periods. Only countries for which at least 5
years of data was avaliable were used in the analysis. The period of analysis is from the
late 1990’s to 2006 for most countries, except for Hungry, whose daily data series stops in
2002 and Poland, whose data begins in 2002. For developed economies and Singapore, longer
data series were available but were truncated to post-1995 period, to facilitate comparison
with other EMEs. Interbank interest rates of one and three month terms are used. The
US is treated as the home country in each equation. For countries that had one or more
crisis during the sample period, the estimates have been reported for the full sample as well
as non-crisis periods. However only models estimated using non-crisis periods were used for
constructing the Integration Index.
Tables 1 and 2 give the summary statistics on CIP differentials for both 1- and 3-month
maturity instruments. The mean deviations for both maturities are significantly different
from zero, except for Malaysia (1-month), Hungary (3-month), Hong Kong (3-month) and
South Africa (3-month). This is consistent with CIP in a less than perfect world, as seen
above and in Cheung et. al. (2003). Also, the mean, variance and range of deviations do
not move in the same direction, so that a more formal evaluation of the parity condition is
needed. For example, although Hong Kong doesn’t have the smallest means, it does have low
variances and range of deviations.
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IV. The Results
Tables 3 to 9 summarize the estimates of the TAR models for each of the countries in the
sample. The developed countries, as expected, have narrower thresholds than EMEs as well as
fewer observations that lie outside of the thresholds, smaller average and median deviations10
outside thresholds and smaller continuous runs outside threhsolds. Among EMEs, Hungary
and Mexico have the narrowest bands (3-month differentials), while Thailand has the widest
(6.08, 1-month). Poland (both 1- and 3-month) and Singapore (3-month parity) are also quite
narrow. Most EMEs have bands that are higly asymmetric about zero, with larger negative
thresholds than positive ones. The model therefore, is able to capture the higher costs to
borrowing in local currencies and lending in dollars imposed by capital controls. Although we
discussed only two types of capital controls in Section II.2 above, this prediction of enlarged
bands when capital controls are imposed is true more generally. Given that even the most
well-implemented capital restrictions rarely involve a complete moratorium on foreign lending
(long or short term), they only serve to make such transactions more expensive and harder
(but not impossible) to undertake. These can thus be transalted into an effective tax, akin
to the tax discussed in Section II.2.1, which any CIP differential must additionally cover, to
be profitable.
Often, the controls seek to (and are successful in11) changing the composition of capital flows
to longer maturities and therefore impose a higher effective tax on shorter term transactions,
while reducting the supply of speculative capital. This reduction in the supply of capital
means that the differentials would take longer to converge to the band edge. To see whether
this happens in our sample, we compute the half lives12 where possible, of deviations outside
the band. Half lives of positive coefficients less than 0.5 are less than one day13 - which
means all developed markets (except Norway) and most EME coefficients, except one or more
10Note that the average and median deviations outside thresholds are measured from the relevant threshold value,
not from zero.
11Magud et. al. (2005)
12Half Life = −log(2)/log(ρ) where ρ is the AR coefficient in the relevant regime.
13Results available on request
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coefficients in India, Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand. For coefficients that are negative,
half lives aren’t defined. But one can look at continuous runs (number of successive days for
which the differential was outside the same threshold) shown in columns (7) and (8) of Table
7. The median consecutive run for all countries is less than 2 (it being 2 only for Malaysia
(1-month) and Japan (3-month)) and the highest third quartile is 14 (Malaysia again). This
suggests that most deviations, when they do occur tend to be corrected within a business
week. All countries, however, have seen at least one run that lasted a considerable period of
time, the longest being Malaysia’s, with a continuous run of over a year 14 of positive 1-month
differentials. The longest continuous runs are, on average higher for EMEs than for developed
markets and are longer for negative deviations than for positive deviations, confirming our
expectations, as controls on outflows are more common in EMEs than on inflows.
Tables 8 and 9 give the estimated Threshold models. All the AR(1) coefficients of outer
regimes are significantly less than 1 (in absolute value) at 1 per cent level of significance15,
indicating market efficiency. Our Index of financial integration is presented in Table 7. What
is immediately clear is that all the developed countries, with the exception of Japan, rabk
higher than all the EMEs in our sample, with the market for UK pound showing most
efficient arbitrage with the US Dollar. Japan is the lowest ranked developed country in our
sample, and I think the reason is not that arbitrageurs aren’t doing their job in this market
- the exact size of carry trade in yen is unknown but widely believed to be ’large’ - but
that differentials in Japan continue to persist because of the undiminishing supply of savings
from the Japanese. Among the EMEs, Philippines and India show remarkably high degree of
openness while Malaysia is unsurprisingly bottom ranked. Our index is highly correlated with
the de-jure index of integration developed by Chinn-Ito but has a low correlation with the
de-facto index based on Lane and Milesi-Ferretti data on total foreign assets and liabilities,
thus underscoring the importance of using both quantitative and price measures in evaluating
financial integration.
14The days here are ‘business days’, so that a continuous run of 369 business days would mean about two calender
years!! Note also that the data for Malaysia starts on 1 Sept 1999.
15Results not shown here, but available upon request
V. Conclusions and Furthur Work
The research presented here reveals a much more efficient global financial market than has
been allowed for in previous studies. Although all the emerging economies in our sample seem
less integrated than the developed economies, in none of them are deviations from CIP such
as to reject efficient arbitrage. The estimated coefficients on outer regimes are all significantly
less than one in absolute value. Most estimated thresholds are asymmetric, with countries
known to have controls on outflows showing lower negative thresholds. Among the EMEs,
Philippines and India show remarkably high degree of openness while Thailand and Malaysia
are bottom ranked.
In future work I hope to be able to relate the estimated thresholds to actual bid-ask spreads,
explore the implications of limited supply of arbitrage funds and of financial repression on
the arbitrage conditions and on bid-ask spreads. I also hope to include considerations of non-
neutrality towards risk and to test whether a modified uncovered parity holds, and to what
extent have the deviations from it corrected by globalization. Another interesting issue one
would want to address is how and whether volatility impacts our thresholds. The entire sample
period can be split into periods in which most countries experienced higher volatility and those
that were more tranquil the world over. Did we see some countries better withstanding such
periods (in terms of thresholds that were not significantly different between the two periods?).
Did the more volatile periods see a flight to quality (which would be reflected in larger bands
for better quality assets and vice versa)?
Table 1. Summary Statistics: CIP Deviations with 1-Month Interbank Interest Rates
Country N Mean Std. Error Variance CV Min Max
Emerging Markets
Hungary 1293 -1.027 0.108 15.160 -3.790 -17.269 21.077
India 1900 -1.088 0.045 3.827 -1.797 -12.809 8.069
Malaysia 1809 -0.084∗ 0.044 3.567 -22.485 -11.422 3.640
Philippines 1851 -1.872 0.058 6.270 -1.338 -47.564 32.383
Poland 1203 -1.440 0.105 13.164 -2.519 -14.006 22.122
Singapore 2605 -0.354 0.049 6.236 -7.055 -11.368 13.338
South Africa 2413 -2.588 0.111 29.691 -2.105 -32.513 39.515
Thailand 1995 -2.556 0.073 10.663 -1.278 -37.978 14.729
Developed Markets
Australia 3051 0.134 0.025 1.843 10.111 -16.704 17.255
Canada 3051 0.108 0.016 0.771 8.119 -10.964 7.753
Denmark 3051 0.070 0.028 2.447 22.386 -25.597 15.102
Euro Area 2021 0.061 0.029 1.655 21.027 -11.504 20.429
Hong Kong 2910 -0.062 0.012 0.434 -10.663 -10.021 2.363
Japan 3051 0.340 0.046 6.503 7.510 -37.603 52.376
Norway 2772 0.231 0.052 7.623 11.931 -24.090 96.644
Sweden 3051 0.111 0.027 2.160 13.267 -24.081 20.695
Switzerland 3051 0.223 0.021 1.366 7 5.245 -12.460 10.832
United Kingdom 3051 0.049 0.016 0.817 18.603 -17.095 10.145
Note. — USA is assumed to be home country, for which Eurodollar rates of corresponding maturity are used. Data
used is of daily frequency and is sourced from Datastream, GFD and Federal Reserve of St Louis Database. The
deviations are on a per cent per annum basis. Only non-crisis period observations are used. For developed markets and
Singapore, full available data (extending back to the 1980’s) is used. N is the number of observations, Std. Error the
standard error of the mean, CV the coefficient of variation, Min the minimum value and Max the maximum observed
differential.
∗Not significantly different from zero.
Table 2. Summary Statistics: CIP Deviations with 3-Month Interbank Interest Rates
Country N Mean Std. Error Variance CV Min Max
Emerging Markets
Hungary 1301 -0.032∗ 0.038 1.842 -42.245 -5.723 6.974
India 1920 0.445 0.030 1.749 2.972 -9.047 5.711
Mexico 1380 -0.479 0.063 5.510 -4.904 -21.857 9.591
Philippines 1878 -0.203 0.022 0.881 -4.621 -12.190 11.546
Poland 1203 -0.468 0.035 1.448 -2.570 -4.672 7.427
Singapore 2611 -0.171 0.017 0.747 -5.046 -5.281 4.398
South Africa 3132 0.016∗ 0.042 5.483 147.250 -11.804 41.590
Developed Markets
Australia 3051 0.138 0.013 0.523 5.235 -20.255 11.902
Canada 3051 0.074 0.006 0.099 4.244 -3.581 5.579
Denmark 3051 0.093 0.010 0.284 5.715 -8.559 5.174
Euro Area 2021 0.055 0.012 0.268 9.482 -8.960 6.936
Hong Kong 2910 0.005∗ 0.009 0.218 97.805 -4.185 17.561
Japan 3051 0.204 0.008 0.203 2.205 -6.098 12.925
Norway 2772 0.162 0.019 0.958 6.057 -7.927 32.817
Sweden 3051 0.144 0.010 0.307 3.837 -7.981 6.922
Switzerland 3051 -0.068 0.009 0.226 -6.934 -5.942 7.120
United Kingdom 3051 0.091 0.005 0.092 3.334 -3.209 3.585
Note. — USA is assumed to be home country, for which Eurodollar rates of corresponding maturity are used. Data used
is of daily frequency and is sourced from Datastream, GFD and Federal Reserve of St Louis Database. The deviations
are on a per cent per annum basis. Only non-crisis period observations are used. For developed markets and Singapore,
full available data (extending back to the 1980’s) is used. N is the number of observations, Std. Error the standard error
of the mean, CV the coefficient of variation, Min the minimum value and Max the maximum observed differential.
∗Not significantly different from zero.
Table 3. Deviations From CIP: 1-Month Interbank Interest Rates, Entire Sample
Country Threshold Estimates Data Range
Negative Positive Begin Date End Date
Emerging Markets
Hungary -1.16 0.01 28 Oct 97 03 Oct 02
India -1.85 0.12 02 Dec 98 29 Dec 06
Philippines -3.94 0.50 03 Jan 97 03 Oct 05
Poland -0.80 0.05 12 Feb 02 11 Jan 07
Malaysia -3.62 1.68 02 Jan 97 11 Jan 07
Singapore -4.69 0.04 01 Jan 95 11 Jan 07
South Africa -2.40 0.20 02 Apr 97 29 Dec 06
Thailand -7.66 0.97 02 Jan 97 29 Dec 06
Developed Markets
Australia -0.37 0.73 01 Jan 95 25 Jan 07
Canada -0.13 0.33 01 Jan 95 25 Jan 07
Denmark -0.20 0.10 01 Jan 95 25 Jan 07
Euro Area -0.04 0.16 05 Jan 99 25 Jan 07
Hong Kong -0.60 0.19 01 Jan 95 11 Jan 07
Japan -0.78 0.29 01 Jan 95 25 Jan 07
Norway -0.52 0.87 01 Jan 95 25 Jan 07
Sweden -0.15 0.35 01 Jan 95 25 Jan 07
Switzerland -0.007 0.49 01 Jan 95 25 Jan 07
United Kingdom -0.11 0.22 01 Jan 95 25 Jan 07
Note. — USA is assumed to be home country, for which Eurodollar rates of corresponding maturity
are used. Data used is of daily frequency and is sourced from Datastream, GFD and Federal Reserve
of St Louis Database. The deviations are on a per cent per annum basis.
Table 4. Deviations From CIP: 1-Month Interbank Interest Rates, Non-Crisis Periods
Country Threshold Estimates Crisis Period
Negative Positive Begin Date End Date
Emerging Markets
Philippines -3.56 0.21 01 Jun 97 30 Jun 98
Malaysia -3.42 1.65 01 Jan 97 31 Aug 99
Singapore -0.91 0.02 01 Jun 97 30 Nov 98
Thailand -6.06 0.02 01 Jan 97 31 Jul 98
Developed Markets
Norway -0.38 0.39 01 Jun 97 30 Jun 98
Note. — USA is assumed to be home country, for which Eurodollar rates of corresponding maturity
are used. Data used is of daily frequency and is sourced from Datastream, GFD and Fed Reserve of St
Louis Database. The deviations are on a per cent per annum basis
Table 5. Deviations From CIP: 3-Month Interbank Interest Rates, Entire Sample
Country Threshold Estimates Data Range
Negative Positive Begin Date End Date
Emerging Markets
Hungary -0.05 0.01 28 Oct 97 03 Oct 02
India -0.97 1.52 02 Dec 98 29 Dec 06
Mexico -0.12 0.003 18 Jul 01 29 Dec 06
Philippines -1.45 1.75 03 Jan 97 03 Oct 05
Poland -0.21 0.001 12 Feb 02 11 Jan 07
Singapore -1.88 0.02 01 Jan 95 11 Jan 07
South Africa -0.41 1.72 02 Apr 97 17 Jan 07
Developed Markets
Australia -0.09 0.26 01 Jan 95 25 Jan 07
Canada -0.05 0.20 01 Jan 95 25 Jan 07
Denmark -0.01 0.10 01 Jan 95 25 Jan 07
Euro Area -0.12 0.09 05 Jan 99 25 Jan 07
Hong Kong -0.31 0.29 01 Jan 95 11 Jan 07
Japan -0.08 0.10 01 Jan 95 25 Jan 07
Norway -0.03 0.62 01 Jan 95 25 Jan 07
Sweden -0.01 0.28 01 Jan 95 25 Jan 07
Switzerland -0.17 0.15 01 Jan 95 25 Jan 07
United Kingdom -0.04 0.21 01 Jan 95 25 Jan 07
Note. — USA is assumed to be home country, for which Eurodollar rates of corresponding maturity
are used. Data used is of daily frequency and is sourced from Datastream, GFD and Federal Reserve
of St Louis Database. The deviations are on a per cent per annum basis.
Table 6. Deviations From CIP: 3-Month Interbank Interest Rates, Non-Crisis Periods
Country Threshold Estimates Crisis Period
Negative Positive Begin Date End Date
Emerging Markets
Philippines -1.23 0.75 03 Jan 97 30 Jun 98
Singapore -0.26 0.0002 01 Jun 97 30 Nov 98
Developed Markets
Norway -0.10 0.35 01 Jun 97 30 Jun 98
Note. — USA is assumed to be home country, for which Eurodollar rates of corresponding maturity
are used. Data used is of daily frequency and is sourced from Datastream, GFD and Fed Reserve of St
Louis Database. The deviations are on a per cent per annum basis
Crisis periods refer to 6 month windows around Crisis months identified using Kaminsky and Rein-
hart(1999) criteria
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Table 7. Integration Index
Country Integration Index Ranking Chinn-Ito Measure LMF Measure
United Kingdom 1.02 1 2.62 5.96
Canada 0.90 2 2.62 2.07
Switzerland 0.86 3 2.62 8.55
Euro 0.78 4
Australia 0.75 5 1.66 1.79
Hong Kong 0.71 6 2.62 11.93
Sweden 0.65 7 2.54 3.79
Norway 0.59 8 2.35 2.29
Denmark 0.43 9 2.62 3.04
Philippines 0.36 10 0.20 1.43
Japan 0.24 11 2.49 1.14
India 0.01 12 -0.95 0.47
Mexico -0.03 13 0.72 0.79
Singapore -0.20 14 2.42 8.04
Hungary -0.26 15 1.08 1.50
Poland -0.32 16 0.20 1.03
South Africa -0.56 17 -1.09 1.25
Thailand -0.65 18 -0.05 1.43
Malaysia -1.31 19 -0.01 2.05
Correlation 0.73 0.40
Note. — See text for details on calculation of the Integration Index and of the Chinn-Ito and Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (LMF) Indices. The values in the ‘Correlation’ row are the correlation of our index with the index in the
respective column.
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Table 8. Estimated Threshold (ASETAR) Models
1-Month CIP
AUSTRALIA CANADA
δt = 0.33 ∗ δt−1 + it for −0.37 < δt−1 < 0.73 δt = 0.97 ∗ δt−1 + it for −0.13 < δt−1 < 0.33
(0.07) (0.10)
δt + 0.37 = −0.10(δt−1 + 0.37) + nt for δt−1 ≤ −0.37 δt + 0.13 = −0.12(δt−1 + 0.13) + nt for δt−1 ≤ −0.13
(0.05) (0.06)
δt − 0.73 = −0.12(δt−1 − 0.73) + pt for δt−1 ≥ 0.73 δt − 0.33 = −0.13(δt−1 − 0.33) + pt for δt−1 ≥ 0.33
(0.06) (0.05)
σ2it = 1.19, σ
2
nt = 6.23, σ
2
pt = 7.76 σ
2
it = 0.45, σ
2
nt = 4.01, σ
2
pt = 2.70
R2 = 0.02, Log-Likelihood = -4911.3 R2 = 0.03, Log-Likelihood = -3449.25
DENMARK EURO AREA
δt = 0.37 ∗ δt−1 + it for −0.2 < δt−1 < 0.10 δt = 0.76 ∗ δt−1 + it for −0.04 < δt−1 < 0.16
(0.35) (0.33)
δt + 0.2 = 0.11(δt−1 + 0.2) + nt for δt−1 ≤ −0.20 δt + 0.04 = 0.04(δt−1 + 0.04) + nt for δt−1 ≤ −0.04
(0.04) (0.05)
δt − 0.10 = −0.02(δt−1 − 0.10) + pt for δt−1 ≥ 0.10 δt − 0.16 = 0.10(δt−1 − 0.16) + pt for δt−1 ≥ 0.16
(0.04) (0.05)
σ2it = 0.72, σ
2
nt = 8.16, σ
2
pt = 3.56 σ
2
it = 0.81, σ
2
nt = 2.90, σ
2
pt = 4.77
R2 = 0.01 R2 = 0.01
HONG KONG HUNGARY
δt = 0.84 ∗ δt−1 + it for −0.60 < δt−1 < 0.19 δt = 1.25 ∗ δt−1 + it for −1.16 < δt−1 < 0.01
(0.03) (0.41)
δt + 0.60 = 0.45(δt−1 + 0.60) + nt for δt−1 ≤ −0.60 δt + 1.16 = −0.02(δt−1 + 1.16) + nt for δt−1 ≤ −1.16
(0.05) (0.04)
δt − 0.19 = −0.08(δt−1 − 0.19) + pt for δt−1 ≥ 0.19 δt − 0.01 = −0.22(δt−1 − 0.01) + pt for δt−1 ≥ 0.01
(0.06) (0.05)
σ2it = 0.10, σ
2
nt = 1.53, σ
2
pt = 0.29 σ
2
it = 11.53, σ
2
nt = 16.68, σ
2
pt = 15.22
R2 = 0.36 R2 = 0.05
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Table 8—Continued
1-Month CIP
INDIA JAPAN
δt = 1.08 ∗ δt−1 + it for −1.85 < δt−1 < 0.12 δt = 0.48 ∗ δt−1 + it for −0.78 < δt−1 < 0.29
(0.03) (0.18)
δt + 1.85 = 0.50(δt−1 + 1.85) + nt for δt−1 ≤ −1.85 δt + 0.78 = 0.10(δt−1 + 0.78) + nt for δt−1 ≤ −0.78
(0.04) (0.05)
δt − 0.12 = 0.81(δt−1 − 0.12) + pt for δt−1 ≥ 0.12 δt − 0.29 = 0.18(δt−1 − 0.29) + pt for δt−1 ≥ 0.29
(0.04) (0.03)
σ2it = 0.87, σ
2
nt = 2.41, σ
2
pt = 2.61 σ
2
it = 1.89, σ
2
nt = 21.53, σ
2
pt = 12.55
R2 = 0.67 R2 = 0.04
MALAYSIA NORWAY
δt = 0.91 ∗ δt−1 + it for −3.42 < δt−1 < 1.65 δt = 0.82 ∗ δt−1 + it for −0.38 < δt−1 < 0.39
(0.014) (0.13)
δt + 3.42 = −0.413(δt−1 + 3.42) + nt for δt−1 ≤ −3.42 δt + 0.38 = −0.20(δt−1 + 0.38) + nt for δt−1 ≤ −0.38
(0.036) (0.05)
δt − 1.65 = 0.657(δt−1 − 1.65) + pt for δt−1 ≥ 1.65 δt − 0.39 = 0.62(δt−1 − 0.39) + pt for δt−1 ≥ 0.39
(0.056) (0.05)
σ2it = 0.50, σ
2
nt = 0.09, σ
2
pt = 0.09 σ
2
it = 1.53, σ
2
nt = 6.75, σ
2
pt = 38.57
R2 = 0.85
R2 = 0.34
PHILIPPINES POLAND
δt = 0.922 ∗ δt−1 + it for −3.56 < δt−1 < 0.21 δt = 3.13 ∗ δt−1 + it for −0.80 < δt−1 < 0.05
(0.02) (0.511)
δt + 3.56 = 0.117(δt−1 + 3.56) + nt for δt−1 ≤ −3.56 δt + 0.8 = 0.163(δt−1 + 0.8) + nt for δt−1 ≤ −0.8
(0.068) (0.038)
δt − 0.21 = 0.563(δt−1 − 0.21) + pt for δt−1 ≥ 0.21 δt − 0.05 = −0.137(δt−1 − 0.05) + pt for δt−1 ≥ 0.05
(0.077) (0.055)
σ2it = 2.00, σ
2
nt = 15.57, σ
2
pt = 18.59 σ
2
it = 7.9, σ
2
nt = 13.57, σ
2
pt = 15.71
R2 = 0.51 R2 = 0.09
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SINGAPORE SOUTH AFRICA
δt = 0.42 ∗ δt−1 + it for −0.91 < δt−1 < 0.02 δt = 0.126 ∗ δt−1 + it for −2.4 < δt−1 < 0.2
(0.238) (0.123)
δt + 0.91 = −0.09(δt−1 + 0.91) + nt for δt−1 ≤ −0.91 δt + 2.40 = 0.194(δt−1 + 2.40) + nt for δt−1 ≤ −2.40
(0.035) (0.03)
δt − 0.02 = −0.01(δt−1 − 0.02) + pt for δt−1 ≥ 0.02 δt − 0.20 = −0.358(δt−1 − 0.20) + pt for δt−1 ≥ 0.2
(0.031) (0.042)
σ2it = 4.72, σ
2
nt = 6.75, σ
2
pt = 5.97 σ
2
it = 17.53, σ
2
nt = 37.08, σ
2
pt = 28.63
R2 = 0.04 R2 = 0.18
SWEDEN SWITZERLAND
δt = 1.02 ∗ δt−1 + it for −0.15 < δt−1 < 0.35 δt = 0.894 ∗ δt−1 + it for −0.007 < δt−1 < 0.49
(0.238) (0.08)
δt + 0.15 = −0.153(δt−1 + 0.15) + nt for δt−1 ≤ −0.15 δt + 0.007 = −0.13(δt−1 + 0.007) + nt for δt−1 ≤ −0.007
(0.048) (0.034)
δt − 0.35 = −0.06(δt−1 − 0.35) + pt for δt−1 ≥ 0.35 δt − 0.49 = −0.089(δt−1 − 0.49) + pt for δt−1 ≥ 0.49
(0.069) (0.045)
σ2it = 0.84, σ
2
nt = 7.22, σ
2
pt = 13.77 σ
2
it = 0.85, σ
2
nt = 2.41, σ
2
pt = 3.45
R2 = 0.03 R2 = 0.05
THAILAND UNITED KINGDOM
δt = 0.901 ∗ δt−1 + it for −6.06 < δt−1 < 0.02 δt = 0.73 ∗ δt−1 + it for −0.11 < δt−1 < 0.22
(0.017) (0.163)
δt + 6.06 = 0.656(δt−1 + 6.06) + nt for δt−1 ≤ −6.06 δt + 0.11 = −0.10(δt−1 + 0.11) + nt for δt−1 ≤ −0.11
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(0.061) (0.035)
δt − 0.02 = −0.527(δt−1 − 0.02) + pt for δt−1 ≥ 0.02 δt − 0.22 = −0.06(δt−1 − 0.22) + pt for δt−1 ≥ 0.22
(0.085) (0.062)
σ2it = 3.19, σ
2
nt = 22.98, σ
2
pt = 3.72 σ
2
it = 0.48, σ
2
nt = 1.46, σ
2
pt = 4.23
R2 = 750.25 R2 = 0.01
Note. — Standard Errors in Parenthesis. Data excludes crisis periods, where applicable. Note that the R2 reported
is for regression through the origin and is computed as Yˆ ′Yˆ /Y ′Y where Yˆ is the vector of predicted values from the
model.
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Table 9. Estimated Threshold (ASETAR) Models
3-Month CIP
AUSTRALIA CANADA
δt = 0.97 ∗ δt−1 + it for −0.09 < δt−1 < 0.26 δt = 1.01 ∗ δt−1 + it for −0.05 < δt−1 < 0.20
(0.05) (0.06)
δt + 0.09 = −0.01(δt−1 + 0.09) + nt for δt−1 ≤ −0.09 δt + 0.05 = −0.16(δt−1 + 0.05) + nt for δt−1 ≤ −0.05
(0.07) (0.06)
δt − 0.26 = −0.07(δt−1 − 0.26) + pt for δt−1 ≥ 0.26 δt − 0.20 = −0.14(δt−1 − 0.20) + pt for δt−1 ≥ 0.20
(0.05) (0.05)
σ2it = 0.16, σ
2
nt = 4.62, σ
2
pt = 0.99 σ
2
it = 0.07, σ
2
nt = 0.37, σ
2
pt = 0.31
R2 = 0.05 R2 = 0.31
DENMARK EURO AREA
δt = 0.97 ∗ δt−1 + it for −0.014 < δt−1 < 0.10 δt = 1.02 ∗ δt−1 + it for −0.12 < δt−1 < 0.09
(0.012) (0.17)
δt + 0.014 = 0.097(δt−1 + 0.014) + nt for δt−1 ≤ −0.014 δt + 0.12 = −0.11(δt−1 + 0.12) + nt for δt−1 ≤ −0.12
(0.041) (0.05)
δt − 0.10 = −0.005(δt−1 − 0.10) + pt for δt−1 ≥ 0.10 δt − 0.09 = 0.063(δt−1 − 0.09) + pt for δt−1 ≥ 0.09
(0.036) (0.056)
σ2it = 0.09, σ
2
nt = 0.84, σ
2
pt = 0.42 σ
2
it = 0.11, σ
2
nt = 0.52, σ
2
pt = 0.82
R2 = 0.03 R2 = 0.02
HONG KONG HUNGARY
δt = 0.58 ∗ δt−1 + it for −0.31 < δt−1 < 0.29 δt = 25.23 ∗ δt−1 + it for −0.05 < δt−1 < 0.01
(0.03) (9.79)
δt + 0.31 = 0.45(δt−1 + 0.31) + nt for δt−1 ≤ −0.31 δt + 0.05 = 0.03(δt−1 + 0.05) + nt for δt−1 ≤ −0.05
(0.06) (0.04)
δt − 0.29 = 0.09(δt−1 − 0.29) + pt for δt−1 ≥ 0.29 δt − 0.01 = 0.04(δt−1 − 0.01) + pt for δt−1 ≥ 0.01
(0.09) (0.04)
σ2it = 0.03, σ
2
nt = 0.47, σ
2
pt = 2.75 σ
2
it = 1.06, σ
2
nt = 2.01, σ
2
pt = 1.7
R2 = 0.15 R2 = 0.01
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INDIA JAPAN
δt = 0.85 ∗ δt−1 + it for −0.97 < δt−1 < 1.52 δt = 1.73 ∗ δt−1 + it for −0.08 < δt−1 < 0.10
(0.02) (0.41)
δt + 0.97 = 0.20(δt−1 + 0.97) + nt for δt−1 ≤ −0.97 δt + 0.08 = −0.04(δt−1 + 0.08) + nt for δt−1 ≤ −0.08
(0.09) (0.08)
δt − 1.52 = 0.95(δt−1 − 1.52) + pt for δt−1 ≥ 1.52 δt − 0.10 = 0.20(δt−1 − 0.10) + pt for δt−1 ≥ 0.10
(0.02) (0.017)
σ2it = 0.19, σ
2
nt = 0.67, σ
2
pt = 0.31 σ
2
it = 0.42, σ
2
nt = 1.12, σ
2
pt = 0.13
R2 = 0.86 R2 = 0.09
MEXICO NORWAY
δt = 2.19 ∗ δt−1 + it for −0.12 < δt−1 < 0.003 δt = 0.88 ∗ δt−1 + it for −0.097 < δt−1 < 0.35
(2.41) (0.07)
δt + 0.12 = 0.06(δt−1 + 0.12) + nt for δt−1 ≤ −0.12 δt + 0.10 = −0.04(δt−1 + 0.10) + nt for δt−1 ≤ −0.10
(0.04) (0.06)
δt − 0.003 = −0.17(δt−1 − 0.003) + pt for δt−1 ≥ 0.003 δt − 0.35 = 0.63(δt−1 − 0.35) + pt for δt−1 ≥ 0.35
(0.04) (0.06)
σ2it = 1.37, σ
2
nt = 2.20, σ
2
pt = 2.33 σ
2
it = 0.25, σ
2
nt = 1.37, σ
2
pt = 7.21
R2 = 0.02
R2 =?
PHILIPPINES POLAND
δt = 0.56 ∗ δt−1 + it for −1.23 < δt−1 < 0.75 δt = 4.37 ∗ δt−1 + it for −0.21 < δt−1 < 0.001
(0.03) (0.75)
δt + 1.23 = −0.18(δt−1 + 1.23) + nt for δt−1 ≤ −1.23 δt + 0.21 = 0.20(δt−1 + 0.21) + nt for δt−1 ≤ −0.21
(0.07) (0.04)
δt − 0.75 = 0.57(δt−1 − 0.75) + pt for δt−1 ≥ 0.75 δt − 0.001 = −0.14(δt−1 − 0.001) + pt for δt−1 ≥ 0.001
(0.10) (0.05)
σ2it = 0.39, σ
2
nt = 1.19, σ
2
pt = 5.52 σ
2
it = 0.70, σ
2
nt = 1.51, σ
2
pt = 1.65
R2 = 0.33 R2 = 0.09
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SINGAPORE SOUTH AFRICA
δt = 0.46 ∗ δt−1 + it for −0.26 < δt−1 < 0.0002 δt = −0.039 ∗ δt−1 + it for −0.41 < δt−1 < 1.72
(0.30) (0.0653)
δt + 0.26 = 0.08(δt−1 + 0.26) + nt for δt−1 ≤ −0.26 δt + 0.41 = 0.278(δt−1 + 0.41) + nt for δt−1 ≤ −0.41
(0.03) (0.029)
δt − 0.0002 = −0.04(δt−1 − 0.0002) + pt for δt−1 ≥ 0.0002 δt − 1.72 = −0.712(δt−1 − 1.72) + pt for δt−1 ≥ 1.72
(0.03) (0.103)
σ2it = 0.55, σ
2
nt = 0.81, σ
2
pt = 0.70 σ
2
it = 1.99, σ
2
nt = 4.28, σ
2
pt = 8.01
R2 = 0.06 R2 = 0.14
SWEDEN SWITZERLAND
δt = 0.99 ∗ δt−1 + it for −0.01 < δt−1 < 0.28 δt = 0.77 ∗ δt−1 + it for −0.17 < δt−1 < 0.15
(0.06) (0.08)
δt + 0.01 = 0.10(δt−1 + 0.01) + nt for δt−1 ≤ −0.01 δt + 0.17 = 0.004(δt−1 + 0.17) + nt for δt−1 ≤ −0.17
(0.05) (0.04)
δt − 0.28 = −0.03(δt−1 − 0.28) + pt for δt−1 ≥ 0.28 δt − 0.15 = −0.05(δt−1 − 0.15) + pt for δt−1 ≥ 0.15
(0.07) (0.06)
σ2it = 0.18, σ
2
nt = 0.91, σ
2
pt = 1.96 σ
2
it = 0.1, σ
2
nt = 0.54, σ
2
pt = 0.92
R2 = 0.07 R2 = 0.04
UNITED KINGDOM
δt = 0.88 ∗ δt−1 + it for −0.04 < δt−1 < 0.21
(0.05)
δt + 0.04 = −0.14(δt−1 + 0.04) + nt for δt−1 ≤ −0.04
(0.04)
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δt − 0.21 = −0.09(δt−1 − 0.21) + pt for δt−1 ≥ 0.21
(0.06)
σ2it = 0.07, σ
2
nt = 0.21, σ
2
pt = 0.40
R2 =?
Note. — Standard Errors in Parenthesis. Data excludes crisis periods, where applicable. Note that
the R2 reported is for regression through the origin and is computed as Yˆ ′Yˆ /Y ′Y where Yˆ is the vector
of predicted values from the model.
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